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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to highlight the service of ex-British soldiers in the 
Irish Army and to examine some of their experiences during the period 1913-1924 
with particular emphasis on the Irish Civil War. There was a constant utilisation of 
ex-British servicemen for their skills and also their intimidation by republicans 
throughout the period but their involvement may have been one of the factors that 
helped the IRA to bring the British government to negotiate. This is also true for the 
Free State Army and its defeat of the IRA during the Civil War.
The Irish Volunteers and IRA was a guerrilla force combating a conventional 
army in many cases by using British military skills learned from ex-British soldiers. 
The Free State Army fought the IRA, which it had also evolved from, portraying a 
conventional military force using many more ex-British soldiers and lessons they had 
learned from the War of Independence against the British and those learned during the 
Great War. The ex-British soldiers helped to transform the army from a guerrilla force 
into a conventional army and it was probably their impact that had the greatest 
influence on the Irish Free State Army in defeating the republican forces and helped 
win the Irish Civil War.
The fact that the Free State government and the new establishment were seen 
as pro- British, seen to be supported by the British with a constitution incorporating a 
pledge of allegiance to the crown was exasperating to republicans. They saw the 
National Army as crown apparatus and the recruitment of ex-British servicemen, their 
former enemies as further evidence of this. The attitudes of republicans towards ex- 
servicemen in Ireland and especially those in the army during the Irish Civil War and 
the impact of ex-British soldiers on the evolution of the Irish Volunteers and Free 
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to highlight the service of ex-British soldiers in the Irish 
Army and to examine some of their experiences during the period 1913-1924 with 
particular emphasis on the Irish Civil War. It will show that there was a constant 
utilisation of ex-British servicemen for their skills and also their intimidation by 
republican rhetoric and policy right through the period. The thesis will show that 
although ex-servicemen fought the crown forces with the IRA it was probably their 
impact that had the greatest influence on the Irish Free State Army (henceforth army) in 
defeating the republican forces and helped win the Irish Civil War.1
Between 1913 and 1924 the Irish soldier developed through a volunteer force, 
established to defend the introduction of Home Rule into Ireland, through a split in the 
Irish Volunteers in 1914 and through an amalgamation of militant groups to become an 
army of rebellion in 1916. Later it became a guerrilla force during the Irish War of 
Independence and a conventional army during the Irish Civil War and post war 
reorganisation.
All through this volatile evolution the army employed ex-British soldiers the vast 
majority of whom were Irishmen. Prior to 1916 the Volunteers recognised the need for 
the experience of these men for training their force. After the split in 1914 the majority of 
the Volunteers followed Redmond’s Parliamentary Party’s advice and many joined the 
British Army to fight in the Great War. They became known as the National Volunteers 
and fought in many of the major battles of the war. While the smaller group kept the Irish 
Volunteers mantle and fought in the Easter Rebellion. After the war those soldiers 
returned to Ireland and some became embroiled in the War of Independence and helped 
train and organise the Volunteers and later the army during the Civil War. The Free State 
purposely recruited ex-British servicemen who they saw as having the skills needed to 
fight the war and mimic a modem conventional force and not just to build up numbers.
1 The British government had used ex-servicemen in the form of the notorious ‘Black and Tans’ and 
‘ Auxies’ between 1919-1921 to combat the IRA and pacify the country. See Richard Bennett, The Black 
and Tans (Kent, 2001).
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It was realised during the war that people with expertise were shaping the army. 
Whether because of the training individuals had received previously, or through direct 
contact and learning from engagements the fledgling force modelled itself to a great 
extent on the British military system as did the pre-treaty Volunteers and IRA. This 
aspect of Irish military history has to a great extent been denied or forgotten. Many 
experienced personnel returned after the war to mistrust and intimidation only for some 
to take part in the Anglo Irish War and Civil War with great influences on the republican 
and government side respectively. It is one of the many histories of the period, which has 
never been fully examined. As a result I hope that this research will add to the level of 
understanding of ex-British servicemen in the evolution of the Irish Army. I believe their 
role was unique and important and that this has been forgotten or written out of Irish 
military historiography and Irish nationalist history.
Secondary sources
Not until recent years and the arrival of historians of the social makeup of modem 
organisations, like Peter Hart and his The IRA and Its Enemies, Violence and Community 
in Cork 1916-1923 (Oxford, 1998) for example, has historiography taken on board the 
different social elements of movements like the IRA and Irish Army.
Richard Bennett’s, The Black & Tans (Kent, 2001) introduces the concept of ex- 
British servicemen being employed in Ireland during the troubles in the early twentieth 
century. Although this thesis is based on ex-British soldiers who influenced the Irish 
Army the book is important for a basic knowledge of the period from which to 
understand the different factions of violence. Although this book is not as important as 
that of Harts in the context of social history it is however valuable for the impact of ex- 
British soldiers employed by the British government.
2 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, General Richard Mulcahy: portrait o f a revolutionary (Dublin, 1992), p. 
182.
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Michael Hopkinson’s, The Irish War o f Independence (Dublin, 2002), is an 
excellent resource for the war in Ireland. Hopkinson discusses the profiles of the 
Volunteers and IRA membership, making note of the importance of Tom Barry in the 
movement. As with all the works on this period, Barry is featured as an IRA commander 
and leader of the Cork flying column and the Kilmichael ambush.
Tom Garvin’s, 1922: The Birth o f Irish Democracy (Dublin, 2005) discusses the 
formation of the Free State and Army and the ex-British serviceman’s place within it. He 
states
‘that the Free State Army, unlike the army’s of other British Commonwealth countries 
was not made up of lightly renamed versions of the old British regiments. On the contrary 
those regiments were proudly disbanded. The new Irish Army was actually a strange 
hybrid organisation consisting of IRA veterans, British Army veterans and young, 
inexperienced and apolitical mercenaries from the garrison towns who traditionally 
would have joined the British Army. In many areas it was organised virtually on IRA or 
Public Band principals during the emergency period of the Civil War but rapidly showed 
signs of becoming a non-territorial, barrack based regular force of full time professional 
soldiers and ‘that weeks before the Civil War ended a correspondent in the south reported 
that the army’s conduct was astonishingly good considering they have as yet no tradition 
of respect for their officers’.3
For a sense of Irish military tradition of Irish men serving in the British Army one 
should consult Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.), A Military History of Ireland 
(Cambridge, 1997).4 Chapter 17 titled, Militarism in Ireland 1900-1922, by David 
Fitzpatrick details some of the experiences of ex-British soldiers in the Great War and 
during the Irish War of Independence and Civil War.
The Irish Army and the Volunteer’s activities during the period have been 
documented through the memoirs of those like Ernie O’ Malley, Richard Mulcahy and 
Florence O’ Donoghue and there have been more in depth studies in works such as Peter 
Hart’s, The IRA and its Enemies and also The IRA at War 1916-1923 (New York, 2003) 
Michael Hopkinson’s, Green Against Green (2nd ed., Dublin, 2004). They examine the
3 Tom Garvin’s, 1922: The birth o f Irish democracy (2nd ed., Dublin, 2005), P.122.
4 Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.), A military history o f Ireland (Cambridge, 1996).
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social makeup and structures as well as the tactical approaches towards the army’s 
ultimate goal of independence and a republic in the beginning and a Free State later on. 
This has been greatly enhanced with the release of the witness statements from the 
Bureau of Military History 1913-1921 in the Irish Military Archives.
Because there is no prize of witness statements by ex British soldiers like those 
in the BMH it is therefore difficult to pin down definitive material on their involvement 
so it is necessary to examine the period itself to understand were exactly their skills and 
as a result their impact would have been most relevant. The actions of the IRA 
throughout the country is best covered in David Fitzpatrick’s, Politics and Irish life 1913- 
1921: Provincial Experience o f War and Revolution (Cork, 1998). Fitzpatrick examines 
the organisational structures of the IRA during the last years of British rule in Ireland, the 
involvement of ex-servicemen in the IRA and their victimisation by it.
Jane Leonard’s ‘Facing the Finger of Scorn’, Veteran’s Memories in Martin 
Evans & Ken Lunn (eds.) War and Memory in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1997) 
is a very important study of experiences of soldiers in Ireland after the Great War. Based 
on oral testimony it reveals some of their victimisation and hardships. Likewise 
Leonard’s ‘Getting Them Atlast’, The IRA and Ex-servicemen’ in David Fitzpatrick, 
Revolution? Ireland 1917-23, (Trinity History Workshop, Dublin, 1990) reveals the IRA 
victimisation towards ex-British servicemen and their families.
Eunan O’ Halpin’s, Defending Ireland: The Irish Free State and its Enemies 
Since 1922 is one of the most important books one can use to understand the Irish state 
after the treaty and during the Civil War.5 From this work one can get a better view of the 
limitations, inadequacies and burdens of the early Irish Army and the ex-British soldiers 
part in it.
5 Eunan O’ Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish state and its enemies since 1922 (New York, 1999), pp 1- 
104.
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Hopkinson’s, Green Against Green, The Irish Civil War details some of the 
attitudes toward those ex-soldiers by members of the army and mentions that General 
Mulcahy had been speculated on as being replaced by ex-British Army officer General 
W.R.E. Murphy. It also discusses the numbers of government troops and the weapons 
and equipment supplied by the British.6
J.P. Duggan’s, A History o f the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991) although outdated and 
in need of expanding is still important as it is based on archival sources and names of 
some of those ex-servicemen who influenced the army. It also gives an army breakdown 
and order of battle.7 However it does not deliver a definitive picture of ex-servicemen’s 
input.
Primary sources
Amongst all the historical works of this period there is only a limited reference to 
ex-British servicemen. These soldiers were important during the Irish War of 
Independence and especially the Civil War.8 Their skills as signallers, drivers, 
mechanics, gunners, engineers and their experiences of combat during WWI was 
invaluable. So there is obviously a lack of material or interest on the impact of this group 
on Irish historiography and this research, by highlighting some of their input, will 
hopefully address this.
Most if not all of the primary source material on this period is located in the 
National Archives of Ireland, Military Archives of Ireland as well in the repositories of 
University College Dublin, Trinity College Dublin and also the National Library of 
Ireland and the British National Archives through their Colonial and Dominions office 
papers and other military repositories.
6 Michael Hopkinson, Green against green: the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), pp 221-227.
7 John P. Duggan, A history o f the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), pp 69-113.
8 Ibid, p. 334.
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The witness statements of the Bureau of Military History 1913-1921 held in the 
Military Archives of Ireland are an invaluable primary source for the study of the 
independence struggle and formation of the Volunteers and IRA. The archives also 
contain extensive sources for the study of twentieth century Irish military history and as 
such one would expect to find a wealth of information on ex-British servicemen but this 
is not so.
The Bureau is important for the study of ex-British soldiers and the attitudes of 
volunteers and local population towards the British Army and those Irishmen serving in 
it, especially after the Volunteer split. But for pinning down actual British ex-service men 
it is very difficult as one has to search through almost every detail from statement to 
intelligence report to find even the smallest references. But what is to be found is, as a 
result, most important.
The army census of November 1922 details every member of the organisation but 
does not indicate previous military employment only immediate profiles.9 Some 
attestation forms provide hints to foimer service with B.A. (British Army) on attestation 
sheets. But this practice did not last and is not veiy helpful in gauging an accurate figure.
The National Library of Ireland holds the papers of Piaris Beasley, Florence O’ 
Donaghue, Eoin McNeill, Erskine Childers, Bulmer Hobson and Sean T. O’ Kelly. The 
papers on Childers, an ex-British serviceman, deal with the Howth arms drop, his time as 
secretary to the Irish delegation during the Anglo Irish Treaty negotiations and his later 
execution at the hands of the army.10 For the early period the papers deal with his 
ideology and beliefs and his early life etc and the experience be brought to his 
republicanism.11
9 Army census 1922 MAI; Valiulis, p. 274.
10 Childers is a prime example of an ex-British servicemen and civil servant having an impact on Irish 
military and political life, trial & execution, Childers papers CP7917, TCD.
11 Irish War of Independence, Childers papers 7917, TCD.
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This repository also holds the papers of Bulmer Hobson.12 These are an excellent 
source for the workings of the Volunteers and make it quite clear that he proposed the 
utilisation of ex-British soldiers and the British training manual in the training of the Irish 
Volunteers.
The most important set of documents available to the researcher on the War of 
Independence and Civil War are those of Richard Mulcahy, Frank Aiken, Cathal Brugha, 
Sean McEoin, Ernie O’ Malley and Eamon de Valera held in University College Dublin. 
13 In these papers one can find many references to ex-British servicemen and 
correspondence which details the importance of these men.
The National Archives holds files on the army mutiny and one can tie these in 
with the files of the Taoiseach’s Dept, on the claims of the old I.R.A and there reasons for 
the mutiny in 1924.14 The finding’s of the cabinet committee, which was formed to 
examine their claims, was that officers who had records going back to pre truce days 
were being demobbed, while ex-British officers were being retained in the army.15
In chapter one I will examine the period from the establishment of the Irish 
Volunteers to defend the ‘Home Rule’ bill through the Volunteer split and the Easter 
Rising through the War of Independence and up to the treaty. It will show that the 
Volunteers followed the Ulster Volunteer Force in militarising their movement by 
employing ex-British servicemen to train their people. It will detail how the Volunteer 
movement in the Southern Ireland recruited ex-servicemen to enhance their capabilities. 
It will highlight the requirement for the skills of ex-British servicemen and there role in 
the Irish War of Independence.
Chapter two will examine the period from the treaty to the end of the Civil War. 
This period was the most representative of ex-British soldiers on the force through
12 Bulmer Hobson papers, MS 13174, NLI.
13 Mulcahy papers, P7; O’ Malley papers, IE P17; Aiken papers, P104; de Valera papers, P150; McEoin 
papers, PI50, all UCDA.
14 Dail debates 26 March 1924, newspaper clippings, Taoiseach’s Dept papers, NAI.
15 Ibid.
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recruitment into the army. This will show that the skills and experience were needed to 
conventionalise the army and that their impact was a major factor in the defeat of the IRA 
and has since been forgotten or disregarded. It will also show that the republican rhetoric 
and violence continued against ex-servicemen throughout the Civil War. Ernie O’ 
Malley was very critical of the government forces during the war. Although he realised 
the importance of utilising the skills of ex-British servicemen men on the republican side 
he still deplored the army and government for doing the same thing and becoming an 
instrument of the British as he saw it.
Chapter three will incorporate the period after the Irish Civil War and examine its 
aftermath as regards attitudes towards ex-servicemen. It will show that the use of ex- 
British soldiers in the army was used as an excuse for intimidation and the mutiny of 
1924 and that the service of ex-British soldiers was a major factor in its evolution and 





‘No responsible spokesman for Sinn Fein ever suggested that because their was a 
political landslide, then later after the time when the then representatives of the 
Irish people advocated such cause of Irishmen going to join the British Army at the 
beginning of the war, that those who went to that war, believing it to be the best for 
serving their country should be stigmatised’16 
Minister Kevin O’ Higgins on the appointment of General W.R.E. Murphy as Chief 
Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police.
Prior to 1922 Ireland had had a long tradition of its manhood serving in the 
military forces of Britain. There was never a shortage of soldiers to man British colonial 
garrisons around the world or to fight in its many resulting wars. Many generations of 
Irish families had proud attachments to the British Army even though Ireland had a 
rebellious tradition of its own. At a certain level Irish society had militarised elements 
prior to independence and so before 1914 the Volunteers would have had experienced 
people to fall back on. Between 1913 and 1924 the Irish soldier developed through the 
auspices a volunteer force, a guerrilla force during the Irish War of Independence and a 
conventional army during the Irish Civil War and all the time utilising the skills of British 
ex-servicemen. In this chapter I intend to examine the impact of ex-British soldiers on 
the Irish Volunteers and IRA and their experiences during the Irish War of Independence.
The formation of the Volunteers was a direct result of the third Home Rule Bill, 
which was introduced in 1912. Time after time in the course of the Irish revolution 
radical nationalists had followed the example provided by Ulster Unionists and elements 
within the British Army.17 The Volunteers had modelled themselves on the Ulster 
Volunteer Force, which had earlier been founded to defend Ulster against home rule in 
Ireland. Both relied on the experience of ex-British soldiers to militarise their forces. A 
confidential monthly report of the Inspector General for January 1913 to the under 
secretary for Ireland reveals some of the tensions.
16 Irish Times, 7 May 1923.
17 Michael Laffen, The resurrection o f Ireland, the Sinn Fein Party 1916-1923 (New York, 2005), p.411.
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‘In Belfast and Northern Ulster the Home Rule Bill continues to be regarded by unionists 
with apprehension and bitter hostility. A body called the Ulster Volunteer Force in being 
raised. It is said that the volunteers will furnish a police as well as a military force for 
service under a ‘Provisional Government’ to be established for Ulster in the event of the 
Home Rule Bill becoming law’.18
Antrim had a noticeable increase in the amount and number of unionist clubs and 
drilling and route marches with members being taught to use firearms.19 The Orange 
Order had taken up the Volunteer movement by May 1913 and urged its members to join, 
with the cities being divided up into sections over which commanders were appointed in 
order to quickly mobilise the force.20 Drill and parades were inspected by the country 
gentry many of them retired military officers and appeared according to a police report, 
to be at the head of the movement.21 By July 1913 a county inspectors report estimated 
that there was 7000 fairly well drilled men in the Antrim UVF with an alarming slide 
toward a militant society.22 A police sergeant in Hollywood, Co Down reported parties of 
the Ulster force practicing signalling, despatch carrying, scouting, skirmishing, 
ambulance drill, tent pitching and coding’. Other units were judged by Captain F. Hall, an 
ex-sergeant Geffrey’s of the Royal Irish Regiment, W.G Ferguson an ex-Sergeant and ex-
23Quartermaster Sergeant W.F Maxwell late of the Royal Irish Regiment.
The Irish Volunteers did the same and later the IRA also used men with combat 
experience like Tom Byrne who had fought against the British with the Irish Brigade in 
South Africa during the Boer War. 24The most able instructors to the UVF and the Irish
18 County Inspectors report, January 1913, Colonial Office papers Colonial Office 904, British in Ireland 
series (Held in British National Archives but available on microfilm at NUI Maynooth AS941.5, box 89 
reel 054), pp 1-9.
19 County Inspectors report 13 May 1913, Colonial Office 904.
20 Ibid, p. 10.
21 Ibid; the strength of the UVF at this time was thought to be somewhere in the region of 30,000 men.
22
Ibid, pp 389-392, in Fermanagh there was 1246 men, Londonderry there was 3349 men, Monahan had 700 and
Tyrone had 3,300 drilled men.
23 RIC special branch report on secret societies 14 August 1913 to Undersecretary N. Chamberlain Colonial 
Office papers CO 904, p.398.
24 Tom Byrne was member of Irish Brigade in S. Africa 1900-02, a captain in the I.V. in 1916 and 
commandant in the IRA in Dublin 1921 WS 564 BMH NAI.
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Volunteers were themselves products of British Army.25 After the formation of the Irish 
Volunteers in 1913 emphasis was put on the training of its members, which would be 
needed in any struggle to defend Home Rule or independence.26 Indeed the need for these 
skills and the probable cognisance of what was happening in the North led to military 
instructions being issued for units of the Volunteers in 1914 to establish along British 
Army lines. They were to secure the services of a competent instructor utilising all ex­
military men possible and the company drill was to follow exactly the drill set out in the 
British Infantry Manual 1911.27 When the insurrection occurred in 1916 the Volunteers 
conducted themselves in a soldier like fashion. Captain E. Gerard of the British Army
said ‘ every officer I ever met who was ever in Dublin was so impressed by the
28extraordinary gallant behaviour of the insurgents.’
Bulmer Hobson made direct correspondence to the British Army and the excellent 
source of military skills that men trained in that institution with its proximately might 
provide. He proposed the utilisation of ex-British soldiers and the British manual to train
29the Volunteers.
First World War, Rebellion and Ex-Servicemen
On outbreak of war with Germany, the Irish Parliamentary Party offered the Irish 
Volunteers to the crown in defence of Ireland, partly to safeguard Home Rule and partly 
in response to Carson offering the UVF to fight in the war. The advent of the First World 
War saw the split in the Irish Volunteer movement, which by this time had reached 
180,000 members. The larger portion of 170,00 siding with Redmond and becoming the 
National Volunteers, many of whom later fought in the Great War. The smaller group had
25 Captain Barry O’ Brien, ‘The origins and development of the Cadet School 1929-1979, in A special 
edition o f the An Cosantor, The Irish Defence Journal, vol. xxxix no. 9 (Dublin, 1979), p. 260.
26 Musketry and training in the Dublin Volunteers, Walsh Papers n.4923, NLI.
27 Bulmer Hobson Papers MS. 13174 (1),NLI.
28 Captain E. Gerard ADC 5th Division British forces in Ireland 1916-21 defended Beggars Bush Barracks 
1916 WS 34800 BMH NAI.
29 Bulmer Hobson papers, MS. 13174, NLI.
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become the nucleus of the Volunteer movement and subsequent rebellion of 1916 and 
War of Independence. This group retained the title of Irish Volunteers and subscribed to 
the ideology that England’s difficulty was Irelands opportunity. The Irish Volunteers 
who had been inaugurated in the Rotunda Rink in Dublin in 1913 (Oglaigh na hEireann 
in Irish) immediately began placing a precise form of military structure on the 
organisation. Volunteer units were called ‘corps’, ‘brigades’ or ‘regiments.’ When the 
first convention of the Irish Volunteers assembled in Dublin on 25 October 1914, it was
♦ • • 30decided to govern the movement with a general and executive councils.
On 25 November 1914 a committee of military organisations was appointed and tasked 
with drafting a proposal for the establishment of a General Head Quarters (GHQ). These 
proposals, which were endorsed by both the Central Executive and General Council 
allowed for the establishment of a GHQ staff comprising a chief of staff, a quartermaster 
general and directors of organisations, military operations, training and arms and later a
31chief of inspection and director of communications.
GHQ was responsible for the overall operations of the Irish Volunteers until the 
establishment of the National Army in 1922. 1914 also saw the adaptation of the scheme 
of military organisation, which saw the main volunteer tactical unit designated as a 
‘company’ and so on. The scheme also provided for the establishment of engineer, 
transport, supply and communications and hospital corps. Volunteer brigades were 
commanded by a general and consisted of three to five battalions. The Volunteers 
utilised the British military manual and system and this would follow through to the Irish 
War of Independence and Civil War.
Already by 1915 many ex members of the Irish Volunteers had taken part in the 
actions at Gallipoli and various other places wearing British uniforms, while fighting for 
the crown. While Irish soldiers serving in France were preparing for the great Somme 
offensive of 1916, back home in Ireland the Irish Volunteers in a bid for independence on
30 Gerry White and Brendan O’ Shea, ‘Irish volunteer soldier 1913-23, in Osprey warrior series no. 80 
(Oxford, 2003), pp 8-13.
31 Ibid.
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24 April broke out into insurrection in the Easter rebellion. Roger Casement had already 
recruited Irish prisoners of war in Germany for the Volunteers, albeit with minimal 
success, to form an Irish Brigade for the sole purpose of fighting the British. Michael 
Kehoe the brigade’s adjutant was recruited and later fought in the Irish War of 
Independence, as did Maurice Meade later a section commander in the East Limerick
32flying column and National Army during the Civil War.
While the 16th (Irish) Division, John Redmond’s so called Irish Brigades suffered 
massive casualties as a result of gas attacks at Hulluch on 27 and 29 April, Irish soldiers 
in Ireland were dying while fighting each other. The rebel fought soldiers of the very 
army who would provide them in the future with military experience of a conventional 
force. The initial days of the insurrection took the government and military by surprise. 
In many parts of Dublin sympathy was not with the rebels. British soldiers and especially 
Irish men serving in the British Army had held a level of respect in the country. With the 
outbreak of war in Europe this was compounded by the fact that many Irishmen were 
now fighting in that war. There were far too many Dubliners fighting with Irish regiments 
in France for the population to think that this was the right moment to embarrass 
England.33
The battles of Easter week were a military failure. Irish Volunteers had fought 
and killed Irish soldiers and ex-members of the Volunteers who now wore British 
uniforms. Some of those same British soldiers of Irish regiments had been active in the 
Howth gun running operation two years previous. But after a week of intense fighting 
and the execution of the rebel leaders public opinion saw the rising as something to be 
proud of. Albert Resborough, a British soldier at the time, said that the army had respect 
for the Volunteers they were fighting as they saw them as very professional and 
disciplined.34
32 Michael J. Kehoe WS 741 BMH NAI & Maurice Meade WS 891 BMH NAI.
33 Desmond Bowen and Jean Bowen, Heroic option: The Irish in the British Army (Yorkshire, 2005), 
pp242-44.
34 Albert George Fletcher Resborough, WS 1604 BMH NAI.
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But many Irish soldiers serving at the front on hearing of the rebellion felt a 
greater sense of betrayal than patriotism. Soldiers of 2nd Irish Guards, although 
supporters of Home Rule were not sympathetic towards the rebels. They, after all were 
fighting for Ireland. Tom Kettle, a British officer at the time, wrote that he was astounded 
at the news of the rebellion. Many of the leaders had been his friends and he himself was 
a nationalist. With the executions he said ‘these men would go down in history as heroes
35and martyrs and I will go down if I go down at all as a bloody English officer’.
Recruitment for the British Army began to drop. There was frequent hostility in 
Ireland to British soldiers.36 But at a different level there was discreet co-operation and 
support offered from serving British soldiers. One such case is that of an army sergeant 
based in Dublin during 1916. At the outbreak of war Edward Hanley was serving with 
the Fourth Battalion Dublin Fusiliers and during 1916 was back in Dublin on sick leave 
from France. He was a store man in Portobello Barracks, Rathmines and while there the 
Irish Citizen Army asked him to acquire some weapons. Hanley relocated close to a 
hundred weapons over a period of years without being caught.37 Soldiers also arranged to
38have their weapons bought and even stolen by volunteers.
Irish War of Independence and Ex-Servicemen
During 1917 and 1918 the Volunteers, spearheaded by 1916 survivors and 
released internees, began reorganising. By 1917 the army had started to produce their
• ♦ 39own training manuals based on the British version. At first there was no real policy to 
procure arms and what was later to develop into large-scale guerrilla warfare initially 
took the form of raids for arms. The reorganised Irish Volunteer movement was both anti
35 Bowen, p. 244.
36 Bowen, p. 245.
37 Edward Hanley, WS 635, BMH NAI.
38 Ibid.
39 The Mulcahy papers contain four training manuals for weapons etc dating between 1917-1919, Mulcahy 
papers P7a/21, UCDA.
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party and anti British.40 The public reaction to the executions of 1916 was a major factor 
in consolidating opposition to British rule. This combined with the frustration caused by 
the failure to implement Home Rule, dissent with the First World War and most of all 
perhaps the prospect of extension of conscription to Ireland aroused much ill feeling. 
After the 1918 election and the British contentment to ignore the moves to set-up the Dail 
and the declaration of independence, the Irish government proclaimed ‘that the existing 
state of war between Ireland and England can never be ended until Ireland is definitely 
evacuated by the armed forces of England’.41
Some in the Volunteer leadership saw the best way of forcing the British out was 
through the formation of the military through conventional styles of establishment like 
brigades and battalion structures, fighting decisive battles in fixed position.42 But this 
could never have worked because of the resources that the British could rely upon. The 
1916 fighting capabilities and the later raid on the Customs House, pushed by de Valera, 
was evidence enough for that. So nationalist thinking on a new strategy was based around 
the non-committal of resources to any hastily organised venture.
General Mulcahy, for one, did not believe in large-scale confrontations during the 
War of Independence although this changed in the Civil War. In 1919 Michael Brennan 
arranged a general onslaught on the RIC all over his East Clare brigade area for one night 
and had not informed GHQ. When Mulcahy found out, Brennan was chastised but earned 
on regardless.43
A new tactical doctrine that argued for a move away from large-scale 
confrontations and towards more mobile forms of warfare using smaller military
40 Peter Hart, The IRA and its enemies: violence and community in Cork 1916-1923 (New York, 1998), p. 
46.
41 M. L. R. Smith, Fighting fo r  Ireland: The military strategy o f  the Irish republican movement (London, 
1995), p. 32.
42 De Valera pushed the idea but Mulcahy didn’t believe in the concept of pitching the forces against each 
other and this culminated in the attack on the Customs House, which turned into a military fiasco.
43 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life 1913-1921 (Cork, 1998), p. 186; Michael Brennan, The war in 
Clare 1911-1921 (Dublin, 1980), p.38.
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formations in combat was envisaged.44 This meant that proper men were needed. It 
involved getting in close and personal, which not all volunteers could stomach. In the 
various contributions to the study of the IRA including those by Peter Hart and Sinead 
Joy’s book ‘The IRA in Kerry 1916-1921’ the question is raised as to weather its 
members in volatile areas such as Kerry and Cork really were the natural bom fighters 
depicted in nationalist and republican popular traditions.45 In Kerry for example, 
volunteers would retreat from ideal ambush sites or get sick during the fight and lie down 
until the shooting was over.46 These men had little or no combat experience.
During this period some like Tom Barry for example brought experience to the 
IRA. The discipline to conduct an ambush or be a part of a flying column may be due in 
part to the experience of ex-soldiers. Victory in the Irish Revolution and Civil War may 
owe much more than is acknowledged to British military training and ex-soldiers 
although others like Ginger O’ Connell were quite successful without this background. 
These people had a different sense of discipline and organisation. The growing number of 
raids and activities undertaken by the IRA meant more exciting involvement for the rank 
and file and these operations helped expose volunteers who were more willing and daring 
than others. This may have been largely as a result of the tendency to rely on men with 
experience and probably accounts for ex-soldiers among the ERA fighting forces.47 From 
a column man’s point of view ‘if you were not a column man, you were small fry, the 
whole of the rank and file were a good help, the inactive men stayed at home and the rest 
of the men were with the columns.’48 This attitude caused many problems to occur 
between columns and companies. Activists in Bandon, Fermoy and Kanturk recruited ex­
soldiers for their military skills over strenuous local objections.49
44 Smith, p.35
45 Peter Hart, The IRA & its enemies; Peter Hart, The IRA at war 1916-1923 (New York, 2003); Sinead Joy, 
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46 Joy, pp 94-96.
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48 O’ Malley papers P17/b/124,123, UCDA.
49 Ibid.
18
The flying column became the chief offensive weapon of the IRA.50 The column 
was supplied with the bulk of the arms available from brigades. According to Florence O’ 
Donoghue ‘ there was sufficient supply of rifles to arm small columns and those on 
whole time service could better defend themselves as organised groups than as 
individuals’.51 Another advantage of small committed units was that they had the time to 
train and develop skills, which benefited the movement as a whole. The small columns 
were far better suited to fighting a war than the vast cumbersome Volunteer organisation. 
They had virtually all the rifles in the brigade, time enough for training and the incentive 
to develop military skills.52
Ernie O’ Malley described a column training camp and instructors mentioning the 
input of Captain Prout, an ex-American officer, who had been attached to the intelligence 
squad and also Dermot McManus, an ex-British officer who was attached to the training
53staff at GHQ. ‘Volunteers were trained first for two weeks in the application of arms. 
By the end of the period they were trained in the elementaries of the infantry soldier. 
During parades the ceremony was a mixture of American and British drill. ’54
With the British committed to a military solution through the reprisal tactics of 
other ex- British soldiers i.e. the Auxiliaries and Black and Tans (the IRA was guilty of 
this too) people who could ‘tried’ to do their best to combat them. Barry had been a 
young soldier in the war.55 He was one of many Catholic ex -service men who found 
military or paramilitary employment under a nationalist flag despite the hostility that their 
war service had provoked.56
50 Robert Kee, The green fla g : ourselves alone, vol. iii (London, 1972), p. 114.
51 Florence O’ Donoghue, ‘Guerrilla warfare in Ireland 1919-1921, in An Cosantor xxiii, no.l (May,
1963), p. 298.
52 Fitzpatrick, p. 181.
53 Mulcahy papers contain seven Oglaigh na hEireann training manuals produced between 1919-1921, 
Mulcahy papers P7a/23, UCDA.
54 Ernie O’ Malley, The singing flam e  (2nd ed., Dublin, 1978), pp 20-22.
55 Tom Barry Officer Commanding Cork no 2 Brigade flying column 1920 —21, Commandant General IRA 
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19
Fig-1 An IRA Flying Column during the period. The exact column and area is unknown. (Courtesy Irish
Air Corps)
Barry was commander of the West Cork flying column and he later explained his change 
of allegiance in terms of spiritual conversion. Whereas he had joined the army in 1915 to 
see what war was like, to get a gun, to see new countries and to feel a grown man, his 
subsequent enrolment in the Irish Volunteers resulted from his being awakened to his
57Irish his nationalism whilst serving in Mesopotamia by news of the Easter Rising. This 
is interesting as it contrasts with the feelings of other Irishmen serving in the British 
Army at the time, such as Tom Kettle, who felt betrayed. Tom Garvin describes the ex- 
servicemen and their militarist nature by saying
‘IRA leaders tended to be younger during the War of Independence, which was a general 
shift in the movement away from the IRB. Many of them had not had any direct 
involvement with extreme nationalist politics and many had sympathised with the Irish 
party. Many had had experience in the British Army in World War I. In some ways they 
were not unlike other members of their generation who had attempted to remain in army 
life at the end of the war by joining paramilitary associations. In a sense they were not 
unlike many of the young men in the British forces who had become militarised by the
57 Ibid.
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war and who had a “contempt for politics”, a “distrust for civilian leadership” and a 
“warrior mystique”. The distrust was combined with a rebellion against the older 
generation as being effete, corrupt, un-heroic and above all civilian.’58
Although there were other column leaders who had been successful without the 
background of British military training it was Barry who later became a legendary figure 
by displaying his experience in the Kilmichael ambush with his West Cork flying 
column. On 28 November 1920 they wiped out two lorry loads of Auxiliaries on the 
Macroom to Dunmanway road at a cost of three dead.59 He held his men in a disciplined 
ambush close to the road allowing only for attack and not retreat.60 A grenade and rifle 
attack was followed by hand to hand fighting after which eighteen rifles and 180 rounds 
of ammunition were captured including thirty revolvers and some grenades. Barry’s men 
had gone thirty hours without food. They had marched twenty-six miles and had lain 
soaked and frozen on exposed rocks waiting in ambush. To remind them that they were 
soldiers who could not afford to wallow in the luxury of shock Barry drilled them 
severely amidst the dead immediately after the action and as Peter Hart discusses the 
killing of prisoners and wounded men. The Auxiliaries lost seventeen dead.
This event has fuelled much debate in recent times with Meda Ryan defending 
Barry’s actions against the theories of Peter Hart.61 But the Auxiliary’s supermen image 
had been dented.62 The discipline, which Barry had instilled in his men, brought a new 
edge to the fighting. Although Hart sees Barry’s role differently and explains that on his 
order British servicemen were shot after they had surrendered.63
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Issues for ex-servicemen
This use of ex-soldiers is in contrast to 1919, which saw the return of men en- 
mass from the war, some of whom were given cottages and small holdings. 46% of Irish 
ex-servicemen were drawing the out of work donations in November of that year,64 Local 
boards and county councils all over Munster for example passed resolutions not to 
employ ex- soldiers.65 Many of these soldiers had been members at one stage of the 
original Irish Volunteers. They went to France with the National Volunteers as their way 
of securing independence. But the returning veterans were not, as a whole, accepted into 
the ranks of the IRA. Nor were they wholly accepted back into society. They were 
threatened and boycotted, their houses burnt and the GAA refused them permission to 
rejoin clubs.66 Even the legendary Tom Barry, in the beginning, was under constant 
suspicion, even while a member of the republican movement and while training 
volunteers.67
In November 1920 a report was sent to Dublin Castle on the kidnapping of Daniel 
Lynch aged 25 an ex-soldier who had been taken from his home at Kilpatrick, in 
Kilshannen on 5 November by armed and masked men.68 This was just one incident in a 
spiral of violence towards ex-servicemen. Jane Leonard estimates that between 1919 and 
1924 approximately 120 ex-servicemen were murdered. Some were spies and shot as 
such. But the majority were innocent and killed as retrospective punishment for their 
service in the Great War.69 On the 4 May 1921, Liam Lynch wrote to Mulcahy at GHQ 
suggesting that in the future the IRA should shoot a local loyalist for each volunteer shot
64 Hart, The IRA and its enemies, p.312.
65 Ibid.
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in British custody and although this was probably designed to prevent the enemy from
• • 70shooting prisoners it may have made it easier to victimise ex-soldiers.
Demobilised servicemen and their families became targets for abuse soon after 
the Easter rising. By July that year they were fighting ‘Sinn Feiners’ in the streets of Cork 
City and other towns. After one incident an ex-soldier was beaten and derided ‘as another 
rejected soldier who sold his country for a Saxon shilling’. He told a reporter ‘it is just 
because I am a soldier. I am in dread of living in my own town’. Another woman 
declared ‘that a soldiers wife would be murdered in the town by the people’.71
Republicans saw the recruitment for the British and later the National Army as 
being almost ‘entirely drawn’ from the ranks of the undeserving poor: all scruff and 
comer boys. Ex-soldiers returning from the war were tarred with the same bmsh. These 
men along with their wives and mothers - ‘shawlies’ and ‘separation women’- were
79 • iclassed as drunken rabble, and subjected to withering republican scom. There was little 
condemnation of shootings and intimidation of members of the police and military forces 
and ex- servicemen and as we shall see later this carried on throughout the period to the 
Civil War and after.73
After the National Volunteers expired some veterans from this group became 
some of the most effective guerrilla fighters and officers of the Irish Volunteers.74 But 
others with less notoriety contributed to the military struggle. For instance there is the 
example of Sergeant Martin Doyle who had been awarded the Victoria Cross for 
destroying the crew of a German gun emplacement ‘single handed’ with his rifle and 
bayonet in September 1918. Less than a year later, Doyle was a member of the IRA. 
Owen Nolan, from Limerick, served with the Royal Horse Artillery. He was wounded
70 Valiulis, pp 68-72.
71 Irish Times, 20 July 1916; Irish Times, 5 August 1916; Hart, The IRA and its enemies, p. 311.
72 O’ Malley papers P17a/34, UCDA; Hart, The IRA and its enemies, p. 149.
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and later joined the IRA. He was the last man to surrender to Free State troops at William 
St. RIC barracks and was interned with Sean T. O’ Kelly.75
According to David Fitzpatrick veterans who changed allegiance found no 
inconsistency in reapplying their obedience and skill to new masters. They relished the 
military life but cared little for the contending rhetoric’s of patriotism.76 Irish men had 
long been a part of the tradition of military service in the British Army despite the 
ambivalent relationship between the two nations. Throughout the struggle for 
independence the training of volunteers in the basic military skills was conducted in a 
covert if hazardous fashion geared solely towards meeting the immediate requirements 
for encounters with enemy forces. Post war development of the Irish Volunteers owed 
more to the British Army than a mere infusion of sympathetic ex-service men. From its 
foundation the force had followed British Army practice in its organisation and training.77 
As their primary function shifted from display towards combat the Volunteers moved 
beyond a peacetime militia on parade to the grim practicality of an army of war.78 This 
practice and the abhorrence of use of ex-soldiers would come into greater effect with the 
reorganisation during the Irish Civil War.
75 Correspondence with Jerome Tierney, nephew of Owen Nolan, address with author.
76 Bartlett and Jeffery, p. 400.
77 Mulcahy papers P7/A/26-33, UCDA.





Reorganisation and ex-British soldiers
In this chapter I intend to highlight and examine some of the impact of ex-British 
soldiers on the Irish Army and their experiences during Ireland’s Civil War period. The 
post war British Army had already realised that a large proportion of recruits who joined 
after the war were ex-soldiers who had acquired a habit of soldiering. Already trained on 
enlistment they represented material of the utmost utility.,79On the other hand a major 
report on the development of the Irish Army up to 1927, produced by the general staff 
stated that ‘whereas other armies had the traditions behind them we have not the 
advantage of experience and even yet are only in the process of building up our 
traditions’. The report noted that the vast majority of men who entered the army had 
primary if inadequate knowledge of military duties and discipline because they came 
from the IRA and had never served in any regular army.80
Theo Farrell states ‘that as a result of experience in the IRA and Ireland’s 
guerrilla warfare, traditions were considered practically useless’.81 The army of 1922-3 
modelled itself on the British Army. The army had been bom in the midst of a civil war 
and its leaders were too busy building up the forces strength and fighting for survival to 
consider the shape it would eventually take. They lacked the knowledge to invent their 
own organisational structure. It was essential that they adopt some foreign system to 
model themselves upon and since its armament and equipment was British it was the 
ideal only model to adopt.82
After the treaty the army split along the lines of pro-treaty, Free State National 
Army forces and anti-treaty, republican or IRA forces. Hart believes that the reasons 
those volunteers who went Free State Army are mostly due to allegiance to Michael
79 Report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into army annual recruiting estimates of effective and 
non-effective services for the year 1922-3, xii, 46 [C 22 -72], H.C. 1922-3, xiv. 777.
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Collins and in which many ex-British soldiers served.83 In 1923 an army survey of west 
Cork concluded that the IRA had survived best were Irregulars had strong family 
connections.84 As a result acute tensions existed inside the army between ex IRA and ex- 
British veterans later to develop into the army mutiny of 1924.85 But comradely links 
persisted between many army personnel and the IRA and information continually flowed 
between the lines.86 Tom Garvin puts forward a theory that the existence of such leakages 
exaggerated in IRA minds the internal divisions in the army and perhaps lengthened the
87period of anti-treaty resistance to government forces.
At the beginning the army had no organised presence in most of the country. 
Recruitment policy was carefully aimed against reloading the new force with IRA 
veterans. According to Mulcahy
‘policy involved pouring cold water on the idea that the Free State Army was a preserve 
for any particular self appointed drops of the national cream. On the contrary only select 
politically trustworthy IRA veterans would be taken and the policy was to absorb into the 
new force the best of the disbanded British regiments in a way which will get over any 
stigma on us for them and get them broken up sufficiently to absorb them. ’88
The absorption of ex-British servicemen occurred easily despite government 
soldiers occasionally going into battle with shouts of ‘up the Leinsters’ and ‘up the
- QQMunsters’. The absorption of Collins’s men was a greater problem and they were to be 
disliked not only by their victims but also by the bulk of the army. The real problem, 
however, was that the army had to expand enormously to take control of the territory of 
the new state.90 As a consequence much of the army consisted of untrained, raw and 
unorganised young men.
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Fig.2 British troops on the left observe Irish Free State troops during the hand over of a military post in
1922 (Courtesy Irish Air Corps)
They were described as being naturally physically brave but ignorant. Officers 
were unable to read maps. Essentially they were ex IRA guerrillas playing at being 
regular soldiers whereas in reality they knew only about street fighting, car bombing and 
private assassinations.91 The ex IRA army officers knew no military law. The soldiers 
were often health hazards because of their filthy habits. Sanitation was very bad and 
medics were unskilled.92 There was frequent correspondence with GHQ on the standard
93of government troops.
91 For criticisms of National Army see Mulcahy papers P7/B/ 231, UCDA.
92 Garvin, The birth o f Irish democracy, pp 122-123.
93 For example see letter of complaint from Sean O’ hEigeartaigh in Cork dated 15 April 1922, Mulcahy 
papers P7a/173, UCDA.
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The army also had other compelling reasons to imitate the British. It contained 
many ex-British soldiers and probably seemed a natural step, as that was what the rest of 
the Irish government was doing. Much of the previous British administrative structures 
and practices had merely been taken over by the Irish Free State. Later with the 
reformation of the cabinet Liam Cosgrave and Kevin O’ Higgins, who were seen by 
republicans as British puppets, typified the new leaders of the state. Maryann Valiulius 
has described the Free State government as conservative, anti-army, not terribly 
committed to the ideals of a Gaelic Ireland, they seemed more willing to mould the new 
state in the image of British society with token gestures thrown to those who clung to the 
old ideas.94 The republican hierarchy expected an internal collapse of the Free State. 
They despised the government because it was putatively a British puppet regime.95 Most 
importantly, the republic was disestablished and an oath of allegiance to the British 
monarch was included in the constitution of the Irish Free State.96This may be one of the 
reasons for the fomenting of republican opinion against ex-servicemen and the army.
Civil War, recruitment and attitudes
The IRA itself had standards of training and planning and had earlier modelled 
itself on the British Army partly in response to British intelligence successes. Later 
during the Civil War the army carried on the same.97 Mulcahy and his staff began
98recruiting for a National Army that would be loyal to the new state. Their uniforms 
were those of the Volunteers, their insignia was that of the Republic, their members were 
pre-truce veterans but despite these similarities, it was a new army. From its inception the 
army followed regular military procedure, wore uniforms, lived in barracks, learned drill 
and standard tactics and was armed with British weapons.99 Republican’s claimed they
94 Valiulis, p. 173.
95 Garvin, The birth o f Irish democracy, p. 125.
96 Garvin, The birth o f  Irish democracy, p. 143.
97 Theo Farrell, p. 126.
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were fighting the same enemy they had only different uniforms.100 Neither side had 
money to fight a war, but the government was supported by Britain.101
Despite this many commanders felt unable to control their units and the 
camaraderie between their men and those of the anti- treaty side jeopardised the army’s 
effectiveness.102 The loose structure of the old Volunteer force made it difficult for many 
to adapt to the demands of a regular army. The employment of ex-British officers became 
a necessity.103 This may be one reason for the recruitment of ex-servicemen to bolster the 
army.104 This worked to a great extent because the army showed little loyalty to former 
IRA members who sided with them against the republican’s but who were later 
demobilised because they were not deemed professional.105
With the employment of ex-servicemen army efficiency and discipline improved 
rapidly. New officers with British experience were sharpening things up in the 
provinces.106 General W.R.E. Murphy, Director of Operations was doing remarkable 
work in Kerry, which went from being one of the most disaffected areas in the state to 
one of the quietest.107
The signing of the treaty on 6 December 1921 was the signal for the disbandment 
of the five Southern Irish regiments of the British Army. It was asked ‘how can there 
remain in the British Army regiments essentially Irish in every way under present 
conditions. Therefore they must go at once’.108 In January 1922 special orders breaking 
up the sixth division of the British Army in Southern Ireland were signed by Lt General 
E.P. Strickland.109 The British War Office declared the Irish command abolished
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effective from December 17, 1922.110 Major General Burton Foster, Colonel of the Royal
Irish said ‘...where a Free State exists the troops must belong to the Free State’.111 By
• • • • • » 1 1 2  February 1922 the new army was recruiting ex-British soldiers with specialist skills. In
July 1922 the Freeman’s Journal had published a poster titled;
‘FLOCK TO THE FLAG 
HEAVY RESPONSE TO IRISH GOVERNMENT CALL TO ARMS 
IRISH ARMY AUTHORITIES PLANS
The appeal of the Irish government for volunteers has met with a most gratifying response.
TRAINED MEN
Preference is being given to old members of the Irish Volunteers of good character. Next to them will be 
considered the applications of men who are able to handle firearms. Many of the applicants yesterday bore 
the stamp of ex-servicemen, who have seen strenuous war duty in other in other lands. 113
Those officers of the Volunteers who had remained loyal to the state were re 
commissioned in the army while others with no connections to the Volunteers were 
commissioned to train recruits and officers and also for posting to the technical corps 
(railway protection, repair, coastal & marine engineers etc).114 These soldiers were 
important in the Civil War.115
According to Hart most army recruits were either ex-British soldiers or civilians 
and many of them unemployed labourers.116 One example of their recruitment comes 
from a memorandum on the army inquiry dated 17 April 1924. It refers to the Railway 
Protection & Repair & Maintenance Corps and states ‘as the corps grew a certain number 
of ex-officers of Irish regiments of the British Army were given commissions’.117
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The recruitment for the army could be sporadic. A report to the cabinet in October 
1922 details how General W.R.E. Murphy, while operating in Kerry, was to recruit ex- 
servicemen, not more than 200 and not after 1 November 1922.118 In the same report the 
army’s strength was put at 25,000 with 2,286 in various stages of training in special 
services such as signals, engineers and Lewis gunners are being specially treated.119
There may also have been transferrals of people between the two forces as this 
letter from General Sean McEoin suggests
‘Soldier named Fred Cantlone R.A.S.C. military transport company. 15 years service, 
whole time in transport. 39 years old, 5 and a half years to go to pension and is now 
under orders to proceed to Belfast. He is anxious to transfer to Irish Army. Saw active 
service in France & Italy, has much experience’.120
But the army rushed people into action without any real preparation. As regards 
the training and suitability for combat of government soldiers one can get an idea of the 
preparation of men with no experience and the need for experienced people from a reply 
to a question asked of Kevin O’ Higgins, Minister of Home Affairs at the time,
‘on the general conditions as regards recruiting for the National Army there was no 
definite period of training for recruits outside of large cities such as Dublin, Cork and 
Limerick until recently. A large number of men did however go through a purely training 
period of four to eight weeks at the Curragh. Once, outside the Curragh, the responsible 
officer in charge of his unit was satisfied that a man was fit to handle a gun properly, he 
was liable for ordinary duty.’ 121
Between June 28 and July 6 1922 sixty-two National soldiers were killed and 277 
had been injured.122 Twenty-four officers and men died of wounds received accidentally 
since 1 June 1922 and steps were taken to instruct troops in the proper use of arms.123 The
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senior staff and General Emmett Dalton, an ex-British officer, had been corresponding 
with a Mr Walker of the Legion of Irish ex-Servicemen to supply ex-British soldiers for 
service in the army to train its men.124
An order for five hundred artillerymen, machine gunners, engineers and signallers 
was made by GHQ and a further list was made for instructors, weapons experts, military 
policemen, armourers, aircraft riggers and fitters, drivers and medical personnel. The 
instructors would receive £5 per week with no specific military rank. They would 
receive an officer’s uniform without rank insignia and maintained at army expense. 
Other services would be remunerated at rates of pay equal to regular army rates. 
Technicians would receive extra allowances. Those who previously held rank would 
retain those ranks. Most of the instructors Walker produced were senior NCOs with up to 
twenty- nine years service and a variety of skills. 125This led to an influx of people to the 
army with some deserting the British forces to join up.
In 1923 the British and Irish governments agreed to exchange information on ex 
members of the British forces serving in the army.126 Many had deserted for enlistment in 
Ireland, which carried on throughout the war and after the mutiny.127 The British 
estimated in 1923 that 5,000 soldiers had disappeared in Ireland since 1916 but this was 
disputed.128 One report alone listed thirty-four deserters who were serving in the army in 
one area alone.129
124 Patrick McCarthy, p. 334.
125 Mulcahy papers P7/B/9, UCDA.
126 Memorandum no 138 S.2140 Dept of Taioseach files NAI.
127 Desertion from British Army in Ireland general file 29 Feb. 1924 - 7Feb. 1925 S.3694 Dept of 
Taoiseach files NAI.
128 Letter from Attorney General Tim Healy to no 10 Downing St governor general’s file Dept of 
Taoiseach papers S.3644 NAI.
129 Colonial Office dispatch 11 June 1924 governor general’s file S.3644 Dept of Taoiseach files NAI.
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Impact of ex-British soldiers on Free State Army
Many veterans did not leave records of their experiences. As such there is a 
remarkable absence of any analytical work on the ex-British soldier during the period. 
Probably one of the more noteworthy of these is Major General W.R.E. Murphy.130 
William Richard English Murphy (1890-1975) was bom in Wexford. On the outbreak of 
the First World War he joined the British Army.131 He saw action including the Battle of 
Loos and the Somme. He was an Irish Catholic officer commanding a battalion of 
English soldiers and in 1918 was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his actions 
during the Battle of Vittoro Veneto.
• • • 132On the outbreak of the Irish Civil War he took up a position in the Irish Army. 
Initially Murphy conducted a course for senior officers at the Curragh during the summer 
of 1922.133 Some of these officers resented taking instmction from an ex-British soldier 
and some departed ending up on the republican side during the war.134 He commanded 
troops under the direction Eoin O’ Duffy organising attacks on Republican forces in 
Bruree and Kilmallock in Co Limerick during September 1922.135 A report to GHQ 
congratulated Murphy’s handling of the attack saying ‘he must be given the credit for a 
well conceived and well executed attack.’ In a statement to the press it was pointed out 
that ‘he considered the capture of Bruree of much strategic value making Kilmallock 
untenable.’136 In Tralee in November 1922 he spared the lives of four IRA activists who 
had been sentenced to death for possession of weapons.137
130 Karl Murphy, ‘An Irish general: William Richard English Murphy, 1890-1975’, in History Ireland, vol. 
xiii no.3 (Dublin 2005), pp 10-11.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Karl Murphy, ‘General W.R.E. Murphy and the Irish Civil War’ (M.A. thesis, NUI Maynooth, 1996), p. 
3.
134 Ibid, p. 3.
135 Murphy was contacted by General Gearoid O’ Sullivan in 1922 and asked for advice in setting up an 
National Army, Karl Murphy, (M.A. thesis).
136 Mulcahy papers P7/B/68, UCDA; Murphy, thesis.
137 Mulcahy papers P7/B/101, UCDA.
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Murphy had the sentences changed to penal Servitude.138 The day after he 
departed from his Kerry command An Phoblacht carried an article on him saying
‘that on Tuesday 19 December Gerard Murphy issued a proclamation on the suspended 
sentences. He was the man who had the power of life and death under English imperial 
authority, he never took any part in the Irish movement... he was never a Volunteer man, 
never a Gaelic Leaguer and never in the Sinn Fein movement... the man who was in 
charge of what is humorously called “the army of the people” in the Kerry area.’139
But Murphy’s personal conduct in Kerry was unblemished by accusations of 
mistreatment unlike other IRA accusations towards Free State officers.140
Attitudes to ex-servicemen can be gauged by the case of Lieutenant Colonel 
Tommy Ryan, assistant to Murphy as deputy G.O.C. operations and training in early 
January 1923, who was sent to the Curragh for training by General O’ Daly soon after 
Murphy’s departure. O’ Daly, a Collins man, knew Ryan had commanded a British 
battalion in France and the Middle East and had been a brigade commander in Egypt in 
1918 and this was seen as rubbing salt in Ryan’s wounds.141
Connor Brady notes that ‘Murphy was both as brilliant and skilful a soldier as he 
was an administrator’.142 But not everyone agreed especially contemporary IRA leaders. 
Emie O’ Malley recounts an incident were he knew the movements and actions of 
Murphy in advance because he had a good grasp of the man’s thinking. He said ‘he 
could also see that Murphy could move his formations across a map quicker than on 
rough terrain. ’143 But Frank Aiken said,
‘The Free State preen themselves on the result on the result of O’ Duffy’s campaign.
From a military point of view the strategy of the whole Free State campaign was good but
138 Mulcahy papers 7/B/72, UCDA.
139 An Phoblaicht, 3 Jan. 1923.
140 References to the Ballyseedy atrocity in which eight republicans were murdered by Free State troops, 
Karl Murphy, (M.A. thesis), p.49; Joe Galvin an ex-Irish Guards soldier was killed in this incident.
141 Mulcahy papers P7/C/4, UCDA; Karl Murphy’s theory, Karl Murphy, (M.A. thesis), p. 56.
142 Connor Brady, Guardian's o f the peace (Dublin, 1974).
143 Emie O’ Malley, The singing flame, p. 168.
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the commanders in the field did not handle men in action as well as ours.. .they relied on 
sheer weight of lead rather than O’ Duffy’s or W.R.E. Murphy’s tactics.’144
Murphy’s problem was changing a guerrilla force into an efficient regular army. 
His preparations for the attack on Kilmallock were hampered by lack of basic military 
training in the army. Consternation erupted at one stage when Murphy ordered trenches 
to be dug.145 General O’ Duffy had also complained to GHQ that ‘the 300 reserve 
soldiers sent to his command in July proved absolutely worthless. At least 200 of them 
never handled a rifle before, were never in the Volunteers nor the British Army.’146 In 
Tralee a Captain Roche had to repeatedly arrest drunken officers. The men were not 
cowards but discipline was very bad.
Some units including the Dublin Guards and the 1st Western Division were good 
but the army needed more people with experience. It was advised that 50% of the officers 
should be demobbed along with 20% of the troops and that units of ex-British members 
be formed. It was stated that ex-British NCOs were the best for getting work out of 
troops.147 But later on General O’ Duffy spoke on the topic of a saturation of ex-soldiers. 
He was worried about the lack of patriotism and ‘espirit de corps ’ within the army. ‘The 
only tales that young recruits were likely to hear about past deeds of Irish soldiers in this 
mercenary army’, as he called it, ‘ were accounts of the Dublin’s in Gallipoli from the 
lips of some ex-British N.C.O.’148 He argued that
‘the army should exploit its rich military tradition and suggested that each battalion select 
a notable patriot whose portrait would be hung in the mess and whose history the soldiers 
would study. The result would provide ‘ something more than a third rate imitation of the 
British Army dressed in green uniforms and a higher ideal to fight for than a pay 
envelope.’149
But a contemporary report says
144 Frank Aiken to MacSwiney 29 April 1924, p. 104/1317, UCDA; Fearghal McGarry, Eoin O ’Duffy: a 
self made hero (Oxford, 2005), p.110.
145 Mulcahy papers P7/B/68, UCDA.
146 General O’ Duffy to GHQ, 4 Aug. 1922 Mulcahy papers P7/B/08, UCDA.
147 Mulcahy papers P7a/141, UCDA.
148McGarry, p. 138.
149 General O’ Duffy to executive council, 30 September 1924 P24/222, UCDA.
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‘having observed General Murphy as a leader in the field, as an organiser and as a strategist, I 
believe him to be the most capable officer I have ever met. He is, in addition, popular among the 
troops, an intelligent disciplinarian and in short, in my belief the one man capable of finishing the 
campaign. The loss of General Murphy would be more disastrous than the loss of 4,000 troops.
During the war other ex-servicemen came to prominence. In July 1923 Major 
General John T. Prout attacked Republican forces in Waterford city.151 These positions 
covered the River Suir, which spanned 250 yards using the waterfront as their line of 
defence. 152 Colonel Patrick Paul, another ex- soldier, produced a plan to cross up river to 
attack the republican left flank and used artillery to harass their positions. He wanted to 
break the enemies morale as they had no experience of shellfire and the effects of high
153 ■ •explosives on men who had never known them can be imagined. However, this did not 
stop him inadvertently destroying his own house.154
All during the period ex-British soldiers serving in the army were fighting and 
sustaining casualties just like others in the force. In August 1922, Captain T.J. McNabola 
was wounded at Boyle. He had served during the European War with the South Irish 
Horse and the Machinegun Corps.155 In August, Tom O’ Keefe was killed in a roadside 
ambush near Mullinavat.156
Another ex-soldier is portrayed in the extraordinary case of Company Sergeant 
Major Martin Doyle.157 He was one of the twenty-nine Irish Victoria Cross winners of the 
First World War. He retired from the British Army in 1919 and immediately joined the 
IRA. He served as an intelligence officer in the mid Clare brigade throughout 1920-1
150 Ibid, Karl Murphy believes that the author of the report may have been Kingsmill Moore, the Irish 
Times war correspondent, who had been covertly sending back reports to Desmond Fitzgerald and Kevin 
O’ Higgins, Murphy thesis.
151 Paul V. Walsh, The Irish Civil War 1922-1924.
152 Ibid; Carlton Younger, p. 138.
153 Ibid; Duggan, p. 89.
154 Freeman’s Journal, 20 July 1922.
155 Freeman’s Journal, 8 July 1922.
156 Irish Times, 17 Aug. 1922.
157 Wexford People, 13 Dec. 1990; Byrne, Cpl, Liam, ‘An Irish soldier remembered, in An Cosantor: The
Defence Forces Magazine, special 1916 edition (Dublin, 1991), pp 28-31.
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spending long periods on the run. After the truce he joined the army and was described as
• 158someone who could not be replaced without serious inconvenience to the service.
The Free State Air Force
The two initial officers of the newly formed Irish Free State Army Air Corps were 
Major Generals Charles Russell and Jack McSweeney. Both had seen service with the 
Royal Flying Corps in the war.159 The first aircraft was a Martinsyde A Mk II.160 The 
aircraft was purchased in December 192,1 by the Provisional Government, in order to 
bring Michael Collins back to Ireland if the treaty talks should fail.161 By April 1922 the 
aerodrome at Baldonnel had been occupied by government troops and recruitment began.
The first thirteen pilots all had war experience. They were Jack McSweeney, 
Charlie Russell, James Fitzmaurice, Gerry Carroll, Bill Hannon, Fred Crossley, Tom 
Mahony, Bill de Lamere, Bill McCullagh, Jack Flynn, Oscar Heron, Wilfred Hardy and 
Lt Amott.162 All of these pilots were ex-Royal Air Force and Lt Amott was later 
discovered to be an ex-Auxiliary and subsequently booted out of the force. 163
Sweeney, Russell, Fitzmaurice, Carroll, Mahony and deLamere all became 
Officers Commanding the Irish Army Air Corps.164 They developed the service and 
fought against republican forces throughout the Civil War.165 Fitzmaurice in particular 
had served as a foot soldier in the trenches.166 He applied for pilot training and had just
159 Irish Independent, 11 Mar. 1965.
160 Irish Independent, 4 July 1997.
161 Colonel Ned Broy WS 1280 BMH MA.
162 Donal MacCarron, A view from above: 200 years o f aviation in Ireland (Dublin, 2000).
163 Ibid, p. 57.
164Freeman’s Journal, 7 June 1922 reported the arrival of an Avro aeroplane to be used in Baldonnel to 
train Irish airmen and the Irish Times, 5 Dec. 1922 reported the first offensive action of an aircraft
165 For a military assessment on this organisation and army see Mulcahy papers P7/B/43, P7/B/47, P7/B/49, 
UCDA; Freeman’s Journal, 7 June 1922; Irish Times, 5 Dec. 1922.
166 Teddy Fennelly, Fitz and the famous flight (Portloise, 1997), pp36-61.
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received his wings when the war ended. On return to Ireland joined the Free State Army 
Air Force and conducted operations against republican forces.167 See Fig 4
Ex-British Soldiers and Legalisation of the Army
A systematic model was needed for the legalisation of the army. In June 1922 Mr Cahir 
Davitt, a circuit court judge, was asked by Michael Collins to become judge advocate 
general to the army. Davitt was under no illusions to the magnitude of the work and 
established a legal section in the adjutant general’s branch, which was responsible for the 
conduct of courts-martial’s and general administration. 168 He recruited a group of ex- 
British officers as support staff to manage the section based in Portobello Barracks.169
The general regulations as to discipline were promulgated as a general order and 
came into effect on 1 November 1922.170 There were many technical problems but some 
defendants at courts-martial were affronted if British Army ‘spit and polish’ was lacking. 
Discipline was good amongst ex-British servicemen.171 But one case was that of an ex- 
British soldier who General O’ Duffy reported to GHQ had been charged with sodomy 
since the mutiny.172 The General Regulations were based on the British Army’s Manual 
of Military Law, which Davitt had purchased in Eason’s bookstore. The later constituted 
Defence Forces (Temporaiy Provisions) Act 1923 was largely based on the British Army 
(Annual) Act and the Reserve Forces Act of 1889.173
167 He became famous in 1928 for his part of a crew of three in the successful first East West non stop 
trans-Atlantic flight between Ireland and the American continent, which took of from Baldonnel in a 
German Junkers aircraft known as the Bremen.
168 Duggan, PP 115-137.
169 Ibid, this was done with the aid of George Hodnett, a Major in the Great War, Theodore Cunningham 
Kingsmill Moore, an ex-RAF officer and defender of Trinity College in 1916, who had been tasked with 
drafting charge sheets and courts-martial procedures by General W.R.E. Murphy and also John Donovan, 
Charlie Casey and Thomas Coyne. All were ex-army or R.A.F. with extensive active service in France it 
was inevitable that British military would dominate the new Irish military code.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid; See also memoranda on penal code in British military law, Mulcahy papers P7/B/56, UCDA.
172 General O’ Duffy to executive council 12 June 1924 O’ Duffy papers P24/222, UCDA; McGarry, p.137.
173 Ibid.
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Fig.4 Major James FitzMaurice, 5th from left, with some of the first pilots and observers of the Irish Free 
State Air Force and all ex-Royal Air Force c.1923 (Courtesy Irish Air Corps Museum)
Attitudes
During the Civil War Republican’s were incensed towards ex-British servicemen 
serving in the army. They felt they were fighting the old enemy in the form of the Irish 
Free State government and army. This can be gauged at a minor level by the attitudes 
towards the National Army and ex-servicemen from those on the republican bench. This 
is interesting as some in the British hierarchy held quite similar views to republicans 
about the army and the inclusion of ex-British soldiers especially in the IRA, albeit in a 
different context.
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On the 9 May 1922 the secretary of state for war was asked ‘if his majesty would 
deprive officers of honorary rank or decoration for gallant service who have joined the 
rebel army in Ireland to take up arms against the forces of the crown.’174 But generally 
people were not sure what was going on and this led to a propaganda frenzy on both sides 
and used the existence of ex-British soldiers in the army and the oath very effectively. 
Some in the British government were unsure as to who was funding the war. A question 
was asked in the House of Commons ‘if the British taxpayer was paying for the Free 
State troops.’175
In July 1922 Frank Aiken, commanding 4th Northern Division IRA, outlined the 
position of his forces reference the treaty and National Army when he asked his men
‘for the countries sake not to join the army of the government with that oath in the 
constitution, no matter what the pay may be or the alternatives to joining are starving or 
going back to Ulster at a time that the disordered state of Southern Ireland ensures 
failure....’176
The new army and government was seen, by Republican’s, as being implicit with 
the British government and taking an oath of allegiance to the crown merely justified this. 
After the army attack on the Four Courts, which triggered the Civil War, anti-treaty 
propaganda denounced the government. Republican propaganda exaggerated the number 
and role of ex-British officers in the army representing it as a green clad regiment of the 
British army. However, it had one huge advantage over the British forces of two years 
earlier, it was Irish and shared with the IRA the local knowledge that the British had lost 
once the RIC had been paralysed.177
There was a divergent view of sympathy towards ex -servicemen. On 9 May 1922 
the Freeman’s Journal reported the repatriation of the remains of 64 Irish bom American
174 The parliamentary debates, fifth series, House o f Commons, lOApril -Mayl2 1922, (vol. 153) (London,
1922), p. 1979.
175 The parliamentary debates, fifth series, House o f Commons, 20 November- 25 December 1922 
(vol. 159), (London, 1923), p. 1487.
176 Frank Aiken papers P104/1247(4), UCDA.
177 Garvin, The birth o f Irish democracy, pl25.
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soldiers, killed in France in the war, to Ireland. Those men had been Irishmen serving a 
foreign state for some of the same ideals as men who joined the British forces. The 
government soldiers were believed by republicans to belong to the same under class of 
ex-British servicemen, which they had derided on their return from the war. They were 
the victims of the same scorn as they shared all the vices, ‘fella’s not working, hanging 
around and hangers on who’d been through the 14-18 war.’179 The majority of those ex -  
soldiers, who were the corner-boys and loafers of the towns a few month ago had brought 
their corner-boy propensities with them into the army and drunkenness and indiscipline 
are the order of the day.180 Hart described this for Mallow ‘were they have now got the 
worst type of ex-soldier in the Free State Army, while in Kerry the IRA foes were the 
drunkard, the traitor, the wife deserter, wife beater, the tramp, the tinker and the brute.’181
Some of the more political propaganda was published in Poblacht na hEireann, 
War News, on 30 June 1922 and was probably produced by Erskine Childers. It reads;
‘RALLY TO THE FLAG 
IT’S A WAR
WHO BEGAN THE WAR? HIS MAJESTY’S FREE STATE MINISTERS 
WHO ARE THEY ATTACKING? THERE OWN BROTHER IRISHMEN OF THE IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY
WHY DID THEY BEGIN THE ATTACK? BECAUSE LLOYD GEORGE AND CHURCHILL TOLD
THEM THEY MUST 
WHO ARE THEIR ALLIES IN THE WAR? THE ENGLISH 
WHAT ARE THEIR WEAPONS IN THE WAR? ARTILLARY, MACHINEGUNS, RIFLES ETC
SUPPLIED BY THE ENGLISH 
WHAT IS THEIR OBJECT IN THE WAR? TO DESTROY THE IRISH REPUBLIC AND MAKE YOU 
SWEAR ALLEGIENCE TO THE KING OF ENGLAND AS KING OF IRELAND.
PEOPLE OF IRELAND, WHICH SIDE ARE YOUON IN THE WAR, THERE CAN BE ONLY 
ONE ANSWER YOU ARE ON THE SIDE OF IRELAND.
178 Freeman’s Journal, 9 May 1922.
179 Intelligence reports, n.d.1922 O’ Malley papers P17a/34, UCDA; Hart, The IRA and its enemies, p.149.
180 Hart, The IRA and its enemies, p. 149.
181 Ibid, p. 149.
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WE HEAR ON THE BEST AUTHORITY THAT GENERAL MCCREADY IS WITH THE 
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ADVISING ON THE WAR’182
Genmaral Dalton, Director of Military Operations at this stage had urged the use 
of artillery on the Four Courts as the use of these guns would have been quite 
demoralising upon a garrison unused to artillery fire. He was speaking from 
experience.183 The government addressed republican propaganda in the Freeman’s 
Journal on 1 July 1922
‘MESSAGE TO THE NATIONAL FIGHTING FORCES FROM GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND
“False and malicious statements have been made against you. It has been said that British troops have
cooperated with you’184
The Irish Times carried another reply on the 3 July 1922 and this time in the form 
of an official bulletin from GHQ concerning the men who worked the guns at the Four 
Courts and issued the previous evening. It reads
‘In view of the fact that fictitious stories are being circulated, it is necessary to state that 
the artillery used against the four courts was under the command of Major General 
Dalton, who, it will be remembered, entered Mountjoy Prison in an attempt to rescue 
Major General Sean McEoin last year’.185
Erskine Childers was instrumental in arming the Volunteers prior to 1916 on his 
boat the Asgard. He was director of propaganda and publicity and during the treaty talks 
was secretary to the plenipotentiaries.186 Childers had service in the Boar War and after 
1916 he again served in the Royal Navy. After the war he returned to his republican 
ideals and was later shot by government forces during the Civil War. Cosgrave and his 
colleagues did not want to make an exception of him as Childers had made some 
inflammatory and misleading statements during the treaty debates, which were perceived
182 Poblacht na hEireann War News, 30 June 1922.
183 Younger, p. 321.
184 Freeman's Journal, 1 July 1922.
185 Thelrish Times, 3 July 1922.
186 Duggan, p. 102.
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to provoke many of those who took up arms against the treaty. The Freeman’s Journal 
on 25 April 1922 carried this article,
187
‘There can be but one opinion of Childers attempt to exalt his superior republican virtue 
by hurling scurrilities from his paper at all Irishmen by flinging mud at men who were 
risking their lives for this country while he was parading in a British uniform. There is no 
honest man, whatever his political views may be, who will not feel a spasm of disgust 
when he finds Mr Childers, the ex-British yeoman, asserting that Michael Collins by 
marvellous luck, secured a wonderful rebel attack upon himself. He insults not only Irish 
readers but Ireland itself. Mr Childers may trick himself out with green white and yellow 
trappings but when his real voice is heard it is indistinguishable from that of the diehards 
of the Morning Post.’188
Of the fifteen men selected to execute Childers only five had loaded rifles. It had 
been prearranged that the five soldiers with loaded rifles were ex-Great War soldiers, 
apparently because of their superior marksmanship. Hence his death was instantaneous
189and the ‘marksmanship very accurate.’
When in June 1922 Viscount Curzon asked the secretary for the colonies how 
many British subjects had been murdered or died of wounds in Ireland since the signing 
of the treaty he was told that since 6 December 15 RIC, 8 ex-RIC, 8 soldiers and 3 ex­
soldiers and 15 civilians had died.190 This was only the beginning and he was probably 
unaware of the scale of murder and intimidation that was still apparent in the country 
against ex-British servicemen. For instance on 15 May 1922 the Freeman’s Journal 
reported the ‘shooting dead of a young British soldier in Batchelor’s Walk Dublin.’191 
On the 18 May British troops evacuated Portobello Barracks Dublin.1920n 22 June John 
Lawless an ex- British Soldier was dragged from his bed on Rutland Street Dublin and 
shot in front of his wife.193 On the same day two IRA men shot Field Martial Sir Henry
187 Risteard Mulcahy, Richard Mulcahy 1886-1971: A family memoir (Dublin, 1999), p.195.
188 Freeman’s Journal, 25 Apr. 1922.
189 Mulcahy, p. 196.
190Curzon to secretary of state The parliamentary debates, fifth series, House o f Commons, 12 June-30 June 
1922, (vol.155), (His Majesty’s Stationary Office London, 1922), p.1664.
191 Freeman’s Journal, 15 May 1922.
192 Freeman’s Journal, 18 May 1922.
193 Freeman’s Journal, 1 July 1922.
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Wilson in London. Both of his killers, Joseph O’ Sullivan and Reginald Dunne, the 
second in command of the London IRA, were ex-British soldiers. They were caught and 
later executed.194 In July Private Rogers, RAF, and Privates Baker and Sutherland were 
fired upon and wounded in Amiens Street. Rogers died of his wounds195 On 3 July the 
Freeman’s Journal reported ‘the false accusations and lies that “British Tommie’s” were 
operating with the army.’196
In the same month at Wallingford England, Thomas Edwin Ramsey an ex-British 
soldier was charged with inciting a private to steal revolvers for shipment to Ireland and 
another ‘Catholic’ ex-soldier was flogged in Belfast Gaol.197 In December a British 
officer was kidnapped and the body of James Cleary was found in Tipperary with a note 
saying he had been shot as ‘a convicted spy,’ ‘spies and traitors beware the first of 
many.’198 On the 18 December, Brian Bradley a Catholic ex-British soldier with three 
years service was taken from his home and shot by unknown men.199 On 1 January 1923 
Pierce Murphy was shot in Waterford by uniformed men dressed similar to the National 
Army.200
In Adamstown, Wexford in March, Lieutenant Thomas Jones, Sergeant Edward 
Gorman and Volunteer Patrick Horan, all ex- British soldiers were lured to their deaths. 
While searching for a missing volunteer they were captured after a short gunfight. They 
marched for a distance before being put up against a wall and machine-gunned to death. 
Jones was severely beaten before being shot. He was found to have twenty bullets in his
194 Peter Cottrell, ‘The Anglo-Irish War, the troubles of 1913-1922’ in Osprey Essential Histories Series 
(Oxford, 2006), p.85.
195 Freeman’s Journal, 3 July 1922.
196 Freeman’s Journal, 3 July 1922.
197 Freeman’s Journal, 10 July 1922.
198 Irish Times, 7 Dec. 1922.
199 Irish Times, 18 Dec. 1922.
200 Irish Times, 3 Jan. 1923.
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body.201 Another soldier who was wounded in the earlier fight was given aid by the 
attackers. He had no previous military service.202 The officer’s family believed he was 
singled out because of his prior service. 203The ‘getting them at last’ element of 
Republican vengeance still rang through during the Civil War.
Although the duality of the service and the victimisation of ex-servicemen was 
carried out all the way through 1916 to 1921 period, it definitely did not stop during the 
war. On the whole there was a fomenting of republican opinion and hatred towards them. 
But in military terms almost all the skill and energy had been displayed by the Free State 
Army not its opponents.204
201 These men were shot with Tommy guns, a high volume of fire weapon preferred by U.S. gangsters at 
the time and used by the IRA, see Mulcahy papers P7/A/22, UCDA; The Free Press, 13 Mar. 1923.





A FTER M ATH  AND M U TIN Y
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In this chapter I will highlight the treatment and experiences of ex-British 
servicemen in the Free State and also how their existence in the army during the Irish 
Civil War and after was used as an excuse for the mutiny of 1924. After the war many 
ex-British servicemen felt alienated. In 1928, 150,000 ex-British soldiers were resident in 
the Irish Free State.205Many could not settle back into their lives in Ireland and some with 
other ex members of the RIC began to emmigrate to the colonies of the British Empire, 
helped of course by the British government.206 The Irish government was in no hurry to 
pay for their upkeep and it was unclear who should foot the bill for their medical bills and 
resettlement.207 The Federation of Anglo-Irish War Victims was set up to lobby the 
governments for assistance and compensation for British subjects in Ireland for loss of 
life and property.208
In 1927 the Committee on Claims of British ex-servicemen was set up at 5 Ely 
Place Dublin. A public notice inviting evidence from organisations of British ex- 
servicemen was inserted in the press 209 The committee had assistance from the British 
Legion, Department of Local Government, Public Health, Land Commission, the Irish 
Sailors and Soldiers Trust and Organisation of British Ex-Servicemen 210 There was some 
claims in respect of service in the National Army who had also served in the British 
forces but these were dismissed as not being in the terms of reference of the board.211 In 
some cases soldiers who had been involved in the Connacht Rangers mutiny in India 
claimed state assistance and pensions for service to the Irish government.212
205 Daily Press, 12 Dec. 1927; Committee on claims of British ex-servicemen 1927-28 Dept of Justice files 
Jus 8 NAI.
206 Resettlement to colonies i.e. Australia of ex-servicemen and ex-RIC, The parliamentary debates, fifth 
series, House o f Commons 28 Mar. 1922 - 7 Apr. 1922 (vol.152), (His Majesty’s Stationary Office London,
1923), p.1158.
207 Irish sailors and soldiers land trust established under section 3 of the Irish Free State (Consequential 
Provisions) Act 1922 for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of section 4 of the above act 
1919, Parliamentary debates, Dail Eireann, 6 Dec. 1922-27 Mar. 1922 (Dublin Stationary Office, 1923),
p. 1082.
208P7/B/395, P7/B/396 MP UCDA.
209 Daily Press, 12 Dec. 1927, its members were Mr Cecil Lavery KG, Brigadier General R. Browne 
Clayton, Mr P.F. Baxter and Mr M.J. Beary of the Dept of Finance S. files S.560 Dept of Taoiseach NAI.
210 Ibid; they wanted training and education for veterans and state assistance, education S4724, training 
S.4724 S.9701 S.10451 state assistance S.983 Dept of Taoiseach files NAI.
211 Ibid.
212 John Flannery participated in Connacht Rangers mutiny in India 1921 WS 1221 BMHNAI.
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Loyalty
An Irish Times editorial on January 9, 1922 sheds some insight into a discussion 
in Dail about the loyalties of ex British soldiers to the new state.213 Deputy Sean McGarry 
asked Mr Cathal Brugha, Minister for Defence, what he would say to an ex member of 
the British Army about his oath to England if he was about to join the Irish Army.214 His 
reply was ‘that the only oath that concerned him was that oath of allegiance to the Dail 
and as long as every member of the army kept that oath of allegiance, which he must take 
when he enters it, then he, Mr Brugha was satisfied’.215 This oath must have been a bone 
of contention to many on both sides in the conflict when it came to recruitment of ex- 
British soldiers. After all those soldiers were seen as the old enemy. But this did not stop 
many ex-British soldiers changing allegiance from the crown to a sworn loyalty to the 
Free State although at the same time British soldiers were still being murdered. Three 
officers and a soldier were murdered in Macroom in June that year and a request was
  t 91A
made to allow British officers to carry arms in the Free State.
The anti treaty side continued to fight a guerrilla war while the army at first tried
2i7
to fight the last war all over again but later took a more conventional posture. The 
planning, training, logistics, officer ship and general ship of ex-British officers in the 
army would have brought a different kind of edge. For instance the army had been 
reorganised on British lines and although it came nowhere to resembling the latter those
used to its structure and doctrine would have been able to maximise their military skills
218to the benefit of the formations they were now in control of.
213 Irish Times, 9 Jan. 1922.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
216 S.2087 Dept of Taoiseach files NAI; The Parliamentary debates, fifth series, HC 12-30 June 1922 (vol. 
155) His Majesty’s stationary office 1922), pp 3556-7; Compensation of death or injury of members of 
British forces in breach of truce 10 Jan. 1923-19 Apr. 1925 S.2967 Dept of Taoiseach files NAI.
217 Paul V. Walsh, 'The Irish Civil War 1922-1924: A military study o f the conventional phase 28 June-11 
August 1922. ’
218 Accounts of the director of organisation 1921-25 D.E. 3/6/3 Dail Eireann & Dail Eireann Local 
Government files 1919-30 NAI.
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General Emmett Dalton, commander of government forces in the Cork area, had 
been an officer in the British Army.219 He had served in Europe throughout the First 
World War with distinction. He was now a very important member of the army hierarchy 
and he was also very close to Michael Collins the Commander in Chief. There were many
other officers like him in the army forces who used their military expertise, learnt in the
• • 220British military system, to further the aims of the government and military alike. The 
NCOs and soldiers did the same and also trained and adopted aspects of the army into a 
disciplined entity in many areas.
M utiny
The genesis of the army mutiny of 1924 lay in the circumstances of the army’s 
creation and hasty expansion in 1922/3. There was an internal dispute between old IRA 
veterans and IRB influence over the direction of the army. Over sixty officers absconded 
from their posts taking vast amounts of weaponry and other material with them. Although 
it was not a mutiny in the strictest sense it did however have repercussions.
Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons, had earlier stated that under the 
treaty an army of between 30,000 and 40,000 men was not seen to have been in excess of 
the provision, which Ireland is entitled to make.221 After some time, if special needs arose
of a larger force to suppress the present condition of dissent in Ireland the government
222would feel perfectly at liberty to consider a larger force.
The estimated strength of the army in early 1922 was 25,000, with 2,286 in 
various stages of training.223 Beefing up the numbers at that period and just after 
extracting itself from an independence struggle while forming itself on the lines of a
219 Vincent MacDowell, Michael Collins and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (Dublin, 1997), pp 69-74
220 Donal MacCarron, Wings over Ireland: The story o f the Irish Air Corps (Leicester, 1996), pp6-27; 
Teddy Fennelly, Fitz and the famous flight (Portlaoise, 1997), ppl9-l 18.
221 See clause 8 of the treaty, The parliamentary debates 23 March 1922, fifth series, House o f Commons, 
20 Mar. - 7 Apr. 1922 (London, 1922), p. 643.
222 The parliamentary debates, fifth series, House o f  Commons, 24 July- 4 Aug. 1922 (London, 1922), p. 
65a.
223 For cabinet reports on defence in 1922 see Mulcahy papers P7/B/258-259, UCDA.
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conventional force in conflict with a guerrilla force in the field, the army needed men but 
would not have had a wide pool of experience to dip into. The army needed to draw on 
the experience of people who had the training to fight this kind of war and train its 
soldiers and the nearest group were these Irishmen who had come from British service.
Fig. 5 General Eoin O’ Duffy front row centre and General Emmet Dalton, an ex- British serviceman, front 
row right take the salute in Portobello Barracks Rathmines Dublin (Courtesy Irish Air Corps)
If nothing else, they brought an element of discipline and professionalism to the 
army, which was not always to be accused of such necessary military facets during the 
war. At a higher level the planning, training, logistics, officer-ship and general-ship of 
ex-British officers in the army would have brought a different leadership ethos. The IRA 
must have heeded the importance of ex- British officers to the army as during the conflict 
Liam Lynch IRA Chief of Staff and a commander in Cork issued orders for all ex-British 
officers to be shot on sight.224 It is these feeling towards ex-servicemen that helped fuel 
the mutiny.
224 O’Malley papers p!7a/22, UCDA.
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The committee findings during the army crisis of 1924, which was set up in 
response to the so called army mutiny and the complaints of its principal leaders, 
Generals Tobin and Dalton. It found that one of their primary reasons for organising was 
that they saw their government and especially the army being taken over by British spies 
and ex-British soldiers who were being given the best and most important jobs while 
people like themselves who had been dedicated to the cause of Irish freedom and who 
had fought all the way through the Irish War of Independence and Civil War were now
225being sidelined in preference for their enemy.
An army report describes some of the prevailing feelings
‘The state of general poverty and distress still continue... in a southern town 
which provided over 200 recruits for the army in 1922 many of the ex-Irish National 
Army men (90%) have not had a days work since they were demobilised...They see 
those that they fought against living in comparative luxury on looted money. A big 
reaction against the government is the only result to be expected.’226
The media post mortem of the mutiny portrayed some of the rhetoric. The Belfast 
Newsletter stated’
‘.. .the army regards Michael Collins as its spiritual leader... the were alarmed at the way 
the national position had been allowed to drift. Ex-British soldiers had been placed in 
high positions while those who had made government possible were forced out or put in 
minor positions... the army council had done its best to provoke rash action... The plain 
truth is that for the safety and stability of the government and the maintenance of law and 
order in the Free State the gunman element of the army must now be got rid off. The 
Tobin’s and Dalton’s and all the others who boast that they won the “Anglo-Irish War” 
are wholly unfitted by what they did in that war and by their claims based on that service, 
to hold any position of authority whatsoever in a permanent military force. The sooner 
the Free State government purges the army of all such, the better for itself and the 
country.,227
In an intelligence report to the army chief of staff reference the Irish Republican 
Army Organisation dated 26 March 1924, Tom Barry is quoted in a speech on the IRA
225 Cabinet inquiry into claims of demobilised officers, Mulcahy papers P7/C/2, UCDA; CAB 2/22, NAI; 
Army mutiny records of commission of inquiry, Dept of Taoiseach papers, S. 3678E, NAI.
226 Fortnightly summary no.l 8 period ending 10 Feb. 1924,Office of the director of intelligence GHQ to 
chief of staff 16 Dec. 1924 Mutiny papers Box 1 MAI.
227 Belfast Newsletter, 12 Mar. 1924; S.3694 Dept of Taoiseach papers NAI.
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organisation as accusing the G.O.C. Cork of favouring ex-British officers. In response 
to these specific complaints the committee heard from a number of people who gave 
evidence to the enquiry and came to the conclusion that in fact only a few ex-British 
officers had been retained after the Civil War.229 They found that the dissidents had used 
this issue as propaganda to foment dissatisfaction and unite desperate individuals who
230 • •were unhappy with the demobilisation of the post war army. With the seriousness of the 
incident to the security of the state the press discussed the situation. The Morning Post 
said,
228
‘The answer is simple. The summoning of General O’ Duffy is the 
constitutionalists last throw of the dice... we can not trust the army... they say in effect 
our only hope is in the unarmed Civic Guard. O’ Duffy knows nothing about war so the 
DMP will be asked to contribute General Murphy who knows quite a lot about war to the 
work of rescue. In this way the Imperial Commonwealth of Southern Ireland may be 
saved for a while.’231
According to General Sean McMahon a former Chief of Staff the number of ex- 
officers from other armies who had been retained in the army was 155, of which 80 had 
pre- truce service. Of the remaining 75 officers 40 were technical officers with 
specialised skills, which the army needed such as medical and legal training. Furthermore 
he estimated that before reorganisation the army had been composed of approximately 25 
percent post truce and 75 percent pre truce officers. After reorganisation approximately 
90 percent were pre truce and only 10 percent post truce.232 There is no other real 
qualifying or contrary evidence for this. But if one estimates that the number of enlisted 
or ordinary soldiers will always be much greater in number than that of the smaller 
nucleus of officers needed to lead than one can see that a larger figure of ex-British 
soldiers with essential experience were involved in the army during the Civil War. If
228 Monthly intelligence reports of director of army intelligence to army C.O.S. dated 26 Mar. 1924 refers 
to IRAO in army mutiny papers, box 1, 08 Dec. 1925- 08 Jan. 1926, MAI.
229 For an official report of parliamentary debates on facts of the mutiny see Mulcahy papers P7a/129, 
UCDA.
230 Valiulis, p. 226.
231 Morning Post, 14 Mar. 1924.
232 Valiulis, p. 274 One can check the statements of individual officers in the army inquiry papers ie officer 
commanding Army Corps of Engineers P7/C/18,; Lt Col Ryan commander training and operations P7/C/8 
UCDA.
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viewed in a manner of military reactionary thinking then one can see that the government 
needed to build up the army’s strength quickly to secure the country. 233
On the mutiny the Sunday Observer noted,
‘The army is lacking a tradition which is the most valuable part of military 
education...mutiny leaders did not know what they were doing. In the Irish Army very 
high commands are held by very young men, who have not much experience because the 
conditions of life in the country have not given a chance for civic qualities to develop 
such questions as the relationship of the army to the civic power have never been before 
us to consider. There is said to be the complaint of “Anglicising the army, but of this 
phenomenon the outside observer can detect little trace except the influence of British 
drill. All or practically all the important commands are held by men whose only service 
has been in Ireland against England.’234
In a pamphlet published by the mutineers titled ‘ The Truth about the Army Crisis ’ 
they argued that the army was being built up of largely anti-national elements.235 Ceasing 
to be a National Army and being officered by and recruited from ex-British soldiers, 
some of whom they had fought against in the War of Independence. They also saw 
active army men who had been active British secret service agents.237 Many senior 
officers resigned in protest against demobilisation of old IRA, while ex-British soldiers 
were being retained.238 There was even descriptions of ‘the Irish loyalists of tomorrow in 
the Free State’ circulated.239 The ‘Tobinites’ procured conspiracy theories that the IRB
233 N. Army strength was estimated in December 1922 at 72,000-80,000 and some claimed 100,000, 
General O’ Duffy claimed a week before the treaty at 110,000 P7/B/153 MP UCDA; P7/B/189 MP UCDA; 
Peter Long Thesis.
234 Sunday Observer, 16 Mar. 1924.
235 Dail debates on army inquiry 1924, Dept of Taoiseach, S.3678A -  D NA1.
236 Cabinet enquiry into claims of demobilised officers in regular army, Mulcahy papers P7/C/3, UCDA.
237 Dail debates on army inquiry 1924, Dept of Taoiseach, S.3678A -D NAI.
238 Letters of resignation to president in protest at demobilisation of old IRA while ex- British being 
retained, Mulcahy papers P7/C/8, UCDA.
239 P7/B/344 MP UCDA; ‘At the time of the boundary agreement a special unit formed in the Curragh 
under the command of an officer, who had served in the British Army. Its men were all quite of a different 
stamp from those who were more nationalist in their outlook. Known as the “Border Unit” it lasted for 
about a year’, The Sunday Press, 31 Oct. 1965.
55
was reorganising and had taken control of the army and there was rumours of Masonic 
influences through ex-British officers protecting their interests."-40
In reality these officers saw much of their discontent through blinkered eyes and 
focussed on ex-British servicemen as some of its cause. But these ex-servicemen had 
helped shorten the war and brought about a semi stable environment. This, I believe, has 
been the real reason for their impact being written out of Irish historiography.





This thesis has highlighted the employment of ex-British servicemen in the Irish 
Army throughout its evolution with the Irish Volunteers, Irish Republican Army and Free 
State Army. This study has shown that their involvement may have been one of the 
factors that helped the IRA during the War of Independence, thus helping to bring the 
British government to negotiate. This is also true for the Free State Army and its defeat of 
the IRA during the Civil War. It should be remembered that those ex-British servicemen 
who played a pivotal role during those volatile years at the inception of the Irish State and 
all the way through the struggle for independence were Irishmen many of them 
nationalists and many had originally been members of the Volunteers in 1913. They went 
to fight for Britain on the promise of Home Rule for Ireland. When they returned they 
found themselves as outcasts, but some ended up fighting and in some cases actually 
leading the Irish Army as well as training the force throughout the period, into the IRA 
and Free State Army.
The Irish Volunteers and IRA was a guerrilla force combating a conventional 
army in many cases by using British military skills learned from ex-British soldiers. The 
Free State Army fought the IRA, which it had also evolved from, portraying a 
conventional military force using many more ex-British soldiers and lessons they had 
learned from the War of Independence against the British and those learned during the 
Great War. During the Civil War Republican’s were fighting the very men who they had 
earlier fought side by side with and who knew their strategies and tactics and leaders. The 
ex-British soldiers helped to transform the army from a guerrilla force into a conventional 
aimy. The ex-soldier brought a disciplined edge to the new army as well as the skills to 
use all the new material and weapons that the British government had provided.
The army recruited many ex-servicemen during the war as policy. After the treaty 
and the disbandment of Irish regiments in the British Army they had a pool of manpower 
to choose from. They managed to get the services of many senior officers including those 
of General’s W.R.E. Murphy, Emmet Dalton and others to lead the army, although 
Dalton had already been a member of the IRA in the conflict with the British.
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But their legacy has all but been forgotten. Their stories were never recorded in 
any other fashion. The Bureau of Military History contains over 1700 witness statements 
of people who participated or otherwise witnessed events during 1913-1921. There was 
no such effort on anyone’s behalf to take statements or record the stories of those who 
participated in the Civil War hence there is no real collective of material. As such the 
impact of the ex-British soldier on the Irish Civil War and army has been written out of 
Irish historiography of the period. And no effort has been made since to rectify this.
We can sum up some of the feelings towards those ex-British servicemen who 
served in the Free State Army by looking at how the post war years and the memories of 
the Civil War affected them by the treatment of one man. When WRE Murphy was 
appointed as commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police in April 1923 it was in 
despite of major opposition from the old IRA list of ‘objectionables’.242 After being 
appointed as commissioner of the DMP he later hoped that he would get the top job in the 
Garda Siochana. But the politics of the time was against him. His service was always 
appreciated but his past record in the National Army during the Civil War and his service 
in the British Army may have been too sensitive.243
The impact of ex-British soldiers on the evolution of the Irish Volunteers, IRA 
and especially the Free State Army during the Irish Civil War was instrumental in the 
origins of the modem Irish Defence Forces and state but has not been really recognised 
and needs to be re-examined.
242 Taoiseach’s Department papers S9050 NAI.
243 Karl Murphy, (M.A. thesis), p.64; Major General W.R.E. Murphy, ‘The Local Security Force: its 
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